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This paper investigates a service supply chain (SC) consisting of a service provider (SP) who is 
in charge of carbon emission reduction and service, and a service integrator (SI) who is 
responsible for low-carbon advertising, considering corporate social responsibility (CSR). Given 
that SP shares SI’s advertising cost, SI may have three types of cost sharing decisions, namely, 
not sharing any cost of SP (contract PA), sharing SP’s emission reduction cost (contract PAIE), 
or sharing SP’s service cost (contract PAIS). We establish three differential game models to 
explore the optimal decisions, and identify the conditions under which SP and SI would provide 
positive participation rates. Our findings demonstrate that consumers’ low-carbon preference, 
and chain members’ marginal profits and CSR behaviors significantly influence the optimal 
solutions. Furthermore, we indicate that two-way contracts (contracts PAIE and PAIS) could 
benefit the entire service SC and its members. Specifically, SI prefers contract PAIE when SP’s 
service cost efficiency is lower, whereas he would rather choose contract PAIS under a higher 
one. More importantly, contracts PAIS and PAIE would be the potential equilibrium contract 
when SI has a relatively high marginal profit. When it is sufficiently low, contracts PAIE and PA 
would be the possible equilibrium contract. 
  
Keywords: Emission reduction, Cost-sharing contract, Corporate social responsibility, Service 
supply chain 
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1. Introduction  
Driven by environmental pollution threat to the survival and health of humankind, in recent 
decades, low-carbon service and manufacturing have increasingly become a hot research topic. 
Extant research has confirmed that carbon emission from manufacturing and service is a main 
source for global warming (Bazan, Jaber, & Zanoni, 2016; Sayed, Hendry, & Bell, 2017; Wang, 
Wei, & Huang, 2016; Xia, Guo, Qin, Yue, & Zhu, 2018; Yang, Ji, Wang, & Wang, 2018). To curb 
carbon emission, many countries throughout the world have designed and implemented various 
low-carbon policies and regulations (e.g., Cap and Trade, Green Subsidy, Carbon Tax etc.). For 
example, Chinese government announced the goal to reduce its carbon emission per-unit GDP by 
40–45% by the year 2020 compared to that in 2005 (Yang & Chen, 2018). On the market side, with 
the improvement of people's environmental consciousness, an increasing number of 
environmentally friendly consumers are willing to pay extra for the low-carbon products and 
services (Achtnicht, 2012; Liu & Song, 2017; Zhao, Zha, Wei, & Liang, 2017; He, He, Xu, & Shi, 
2019). Accordingly, more and more companies would consider their environmental impacts while 
making operational and strategic decisions to meet social environmental protection standards. Yang 
and Chen (2018) state that many companies do volunteer to report their products and services’ 
carbon footprints and endeavor to decrease carbon emissions. For instance, Swiss Post, HP, Sony 




So far, most studies on low-carbon supply chains have investigated the issue of how to strike a 
balance between financial benefit and the cost of environmental protection for physical goods (Bai, 
Chen, & Xu, 2017; Zhang, Wang, Yu, & Ren, 2019; Zhou & Ye, 2018; Zu, Chen, & Fan, 2018). By 
contrast, research on low-carbon service supply chains has been limited. Actually, service industry 
has become a major driving force for many countries’ economic growth with the continuous 
                                                        
1 https://climatesavers.org/partners-companies/. 
 
improvement of people's living standard. However, some researchers argue that service industries 
such as transportation and tourism, have generated a large number of used products (e.g., waste 
cartons and plastic bags) to be disposable (He, He, & Xu, 2018; Liu, Xu, & Kouhpaenejad, 2013; 
Liu, Wang, Zhu, Wang, & Shen, 2017). These would generate a huge amount of carbon emission, 
especially in the current rapid development of e-commerce era. According to the report by Guizhou 
Expressway Bureau, during the China National Day holiday, garbage generated by consumers’ 
travel consumption was more than 1252 tons, which resulted in a great amount of carbon emission
1
. 
Therefore, it is of practical significance and essential for the governments and enterprises to control 
carbon emission in service supply chains.  
When it comes to firms’ sustainable operation, corporate social responsibility (CSR) is one of 
the most important factors that could affect enterprises’ pricing and/or service decisions (Cruz & 
Matsypura, 2009; Hsueh & Chang, 2008). CSR here means companies voluntarily undertake the 
responsibility for the negative impacts of their business activities on the society, consumers and 
environment (Andersen & Skjoett-Larsen, 2009). Some scholars have confirmed that CSR could 
significantly influence consumer satisfaction, consumer-firm identification, and positive attitudes 
towards enterprises (Eisingerich, Rubera, Seifert, & Bhardwaj, 2011; Yoon, Gürhan-Canli, & 
Schwarz, 2006). Nowadays, some companies (e.g., Travelocity, Airbnb, WalMart, and Ctrip) are 
increasingly incorporating the CSR into their strategic decision-making processes to improve their 
brand images. Additionally, government environmental regulations (e.g., Extended Producer 
Responsibility, Carbon tax etc.) and consumers’ pressures also urge service enterprises to consider 
the negative environmental impact of their business activities. Hence, it is urgent to strengthen the 
research on how CSR affects service supply chains’ operational performance.  
Cooperation is one of the most effective means to improve enterprises’ or a supply chain’s 
operational performance (Cachon & Lariviere, 2005; Luo, Chen, & Wang, 2016; Wang et al., 2016; 
Xu, He, Xu, & Zhang, 2017). Many scholars have proposed various coordination contracts, such as 
                                                        
1 http://hotel.chinairn.com/news/20170207/151737920.html. 
 
quantity discount, quantity flexibility, revenue sharing, cost-sharing and two-part tariff contracts, to 
help managers make better cooperative decisions and achieve Pareto improvement (Cachon & 
Lariviere, 2005; Tsay, 1999; Zhou, Bao, Chen, & Xu, 2016). Wherein, cost-sharing contracts have 
been proved to be effective and widely used to coordinate supply chains, especially when extra cost 
occurs (Ghosh & Shah, 2015; Zhou, Guo, & Zhou, 2018). Particularly, Zhou et al. (2016) propose 
and compare the cooperative advertising cost-sharing contract and the cooperative advertising and 
emission reduction cost-sharing contract. They revealed that the first contract cannot realize channel 
coordination but the second contract can under certain condition. Building on the previous research, 
we focus on exploring how cost-sharing contracts work in a low-carbon service SC. Differently, our 
paper incorporates firms’ CSR behaviors and service decisions. Besides, many studies have 
confirmed that the differential game is more appropriate to characterize the emission reduction 
process (Zhou & Ye, 2018; Zu et al., 2018). Hence, considering long-term cumulative carbon 
emission reduction is another main difference that this paper has. 
Inspired by the real business problems, this study considers a low-carbon service SC consisting 
of a service provider (SP) who is accountable for emission reduction and service and a service 
integrator (SI) who is responsible for advertising. Under such a context, SP shares SI’s advertising 
cost while SI has different types of costs (i.e., SP’s service cost or emission reduction cost) to opt. 
Many scholars have indicated that upstream firm sharing the downstream firm’s advertising cost 
outperforms the case of no cost sharing (Zhou et al., 2016). Accordingly, we here concentrate on the 
case in which SP always shares SI’s advertising cost and omit the no sharing one, which will be 
discussed in Proposition 3. Consequently, given that SP shares the advertising cost, we propose 
three different cost-sharing contracts based on SI’s distinct cost-sharing decisions, namely, (1) SI 
does not share any cost of SP (contract PA); (2) SI shares SP’s carbon emission reduction cost 
(contract PAIE); and (3) SI shares SP’s service cost (contract PAIS). The main purpose of this paper 
is to discuss the advantage of each contract in the presence of firms’ CSR behaviors. Specifically, 
the research questions are: 
 
 What are the optimal decisions for chain members under different cost-sharing contracts? 
 Which contract is the best option for each member, the service SC or the environment? 
 How do the critical system factors, especially the CSR-related factors, affect the optimal 
outcomes and contract decisions? 
To address the above questions, this article develops three SP-Stackelberg differential game 
models to investigate SP's service and emission reduction decisions as well as SI’s advertising 
decision in the presence of CSR. Based on the proposed cost-sharing contracts, we derive the 
optimal service levels, carbon emission reduction and advertising efforts for the participants as well 
as their optimum cost-sharing rates. We further compare these three contracts to discuss the optimal 
contract choice from different perspectives. We also examine the impacts of CSR-related factors on 
SP’s and SI’s optimal outcomes. Through numerical examples and sensitivity analyses, we further 
check the roles some system parameters play in the low-carbon service SC. 
We organize the remaining of this paper as follows. We briefly present the relevant literature in 
Section 2. In Section 3, the general differential game framework and assumptions are presented. 
Section 4 derives the equilibrium solutions and explores the impacts of environment-related factors. 
In Section 5, the comparative analyses among different contracts are conducted. Numerical 
experiments and sensitivity analyses are performed to validate and enrich our analytical results in 
Section 6. Finally, Section 7 summarizes the paper and provides several future research directions.  
2. Literature review 
Three main streams of literature are closely related to our work: (1) emission reduction in 
low-carbon supply chains; (2) corporate social responsibility; (3) cost-sharing contract. 
2.1. Emission reduction in low-carbon supply chains 
With the rapid increase of consumers’ environmental awareness, more and more firms are 
spontaneously implementing low-carbon operations to address the social and civil environmental 
concerns so as to strengthen their brand image and expand their market shares (Cao & Yu, 2018; 
 
Ghosh & Shah 2015; Shen, Ding, Chen, Chan, Govindan, & Wagner, 2017; Zhou et al., 2016; Zu et 
al., 2018). To promote sustainable development, many scholars and practitioners have paid much 
attention to firms’ low-carbon activities (e.g., Bazan et al., 2016; Zu et al., 2018). Particularly, Luo 
et al. (2016) look into the effect of coopetition between two manufacturers who have different 
emission reduction efficiencies. They discover that manufacturers’ coopetition behavior can result 
in more profits and less total carbon emissions. Ji, Zhang, and Yang (2017) consider a channel 
selection problem under both cap-and-trade regulation and consumers' environmental preference. 
They show that manufacturer can obtain benefit through adding an online channel when consumers’ 
environmental preference is sufficiently high and the retailer is more favorable to the single-channel 
structure as consumers’ environmental preference increases. Cao and Yu (2018) consider a 
capital-constrained and emission-dependent SC under carbon cap-and-trade mechanism. They 
uncover that carbon emission cap cannot affect the optimal ordering quantity under centralized 
decision. Yang et al. (2018) study a joint decision issue of manufacturer’s channel selection and 
carbon emission reduction effort. Their findings indicate that products' features and the degree of 
consumers' channel preference exert significant influences on manufacturer's channel decision. 
Zhou and Ye (2018) develop a differential game model to investigate the joint emission reduction 
and coordination issues in a dual-channel low-carbon SC. Their results show that exogenous 
wholesale price and customers’ channel preference towards offline channel play critical roles in 
setting emission reduction and advertising efforts.  
Most of the previous studies focus on exploring the optimal emission abatement investment 
and/or SC coordination without considering firms’ CSR behaviors or service decisions, which is 
one main feature that this paper differs from them.  
2.2. Corporate social responsibility 
The second stream of research relevant to our work is Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). 
Numerous empirical studies have shown that CSR plays a crucial role in market expansion and 
 
brand improvement (see Andersen & Skjoett-Larsen, 2009; Eisingerich et al., 2011; Lee & Tang, 
2017; Luo et al., 2016; Panda, Modak, & Cardenas-Barron, 2017). Lombart and Louis (2014) 
explore the effect of retailer’s CSR behavior by collecting data from 352 consumers of a French 
grocery retailer. They discover that perceived CSR is positively (negatively) associated with the 
retailer personal conscientiousness (disingenuousness). Han and Yoon (2015) integrate 
environmental awareness, perceived effectiveness, reputation and eco-friendly behavior to examine 
tourists’ intention formation when choosing an environmentally responsible hotel. They confirm 
that higher tourists’ environmental desire and firms’ environmentally responsible reputation could 
enhance guests’ pro-environmental intention. Agan, Kuzey, Acar, and Acikgoz (2016) develop a 
partial least square structural equation model to examine the relationship between CSR and 
environmental supplier development. Their finding demonstrates that CSR is positively associated 
with environmental supplier development. Some researchers have discussed the impacts of CSR 
from a theoretical point of view (e.g., Hsueh, 2014; Letizia & Hendrikse, 2016; Yuen, Thai, Wong, 
& Wang, 2018). Particularly, Arya and Mittendorf (2015) discuss the effects of government’s 
subsidies for CSR on SC members’ production and donation decisions. They underscore that 
downstream firms, who engage in CSR activities, become more sensitive to supplier’s pricing 
decisions and government’s subsidy can incentivize firms to donate. Banerjee and Wathieu (2017) 
investigate the optimal CSR effort decisions in the monopoly and duopoly market. They find that 
CSR has a substitute for product quality to some extent. Wu, Li, Gou, and Gu (2017) consider a 
two-level international SC where the oversea supplier’s social misconduct may damage original 
equipment manufacturer’s CSR towards consumers. Panda et al. (2017) investigate how CSR 
affects chain members’ profits and employ the revenue sharing contract to coordinate the socially 
responsible closed-loop SC. They indicate that CSR is a costly endeavor but it can generate an 
access for the manufacturer to adjust surplus profit share.  
Most aforementioned studies assume that only one of chain members has CSR behavior and all 
of them consider a static context. Diverging from them, the focus of this research lies in developing 
 
differential game models to investigate the issue of how service firms’ CSR behaviors affect their 
joint curbing carbon emission and contract designs.  
2.3. Cost-sharing contract 
The last stream of literature related to our paper is regarding cost-sharing contract, which has a 
long-standing tradition in SC coordination management (e.g., Chutani & Sethi, 2018; Frisk, 
Göthe-Lundgren, Jörnsten, & Rönnqvistab, 2010; Liu, Quan, Li, & Forrest, 2018; Wang et al., 
2016). Ghosh and Shah (2015) investigate the influence of cost-sharing contract on chain members’ 
operational decisions in a green supply chain. They develop and compare the retailer providing 
cost-sharing contract and both manufacturer and retailer bargaining on the contract. Xu et al. (2017) 
employ the wholesale price contract and cost-sharing contract to coordinate the green supply chain 
under cap-and-trade regulation. They show that both contracts can achieve SC coordination. Yang, 
Shan, and Jin (2017) investigate the capacity planning issue by incorporating full capacity 
cost-sharing contract and partial capacity cost-sharing contract. Comparing these two contracts 
yields that the retailer would share more cost but less capacity quantity in the second contract than 
that in the first one. Bai et al. (2017) look into the SC coordination issue in a sustainable SC system 
with deteriorating items. They develop a two-part tariff contract and a revenue and promotional 
cost-sharing contract in order to realize SC coordination. They show that the former contract is 
more robust than the latter. Yang and Chen (2018) examine the impacts of retailer’s 
revenue-sharing contract and cost-sharing contract towards the manufacturer in a retailer-driven 
carbon emission reduction SC, considering consumers’ environmental awareness and carbon tax. 
They confirm that both contracts can contribute to the performance improvement and can stimulate 
the manufacturer to enhance emission abatement effort. Considering the problem of free riding in a 
dual-channel SC, Zhou et al. (2018) investigate the pricing decision of a manufacturer and propose 
a service-cost sharing contract to improve the SC’s performance.  
The above research results have consistently indicated that cost-sharing contract is an effective 
 
coordination mechanism. The novelty of this research is that we focus on exploring the joint 
decisions of optimal service level, carbon abatement and advertising efforts and analyze the 
advantage of each cost-sharing contract under different circumstances by incorporating firms’ CSR 
behaviors. 
3. Model description and assumptions 
Table 1 Notation and definitions. 
 
Notation Definitions 
     Effort towards service of SP 
     Effort towards emission reduction of SP 
     Effort towards advertising of SI 
     SP’s cost-sharing rate on SI’s advertising effort,          
     SI’s cost-sharing rate on SP’s basic service or emission reduction effort,          
     
Reduction of emissions at time          with initial carbon emission reduction 
              
   Marginal profit of SP or SI,         
  ,    
Coefficient associated with SP’s emission reduction effort and SI’s advertising effort in the 
function of emission reduction,     ,      
   Decay rate of the emission reduction 
     Demand for the service product at time    
 ,  ,   
Coefficient associated with SP’s service effort, SI’s advertising effort and the emission 
reduction in the demand function,    ,    ,     
   
Cost sensitivity coefficient to SP’s service and emission reduction efforts, and SI’s 
advertising effort,         
  Corporate social responsibility of the supply chain 
  Relative CSR of SI relative to SP,     denotes SP’s relative CSR 
  
     Utility function of SP, SI or supply chain in   contract,                           
  
     Net value function of SP or SI,                         
  Discount rate 
Note that the superscript * denotes the optimal feedback solutions; The superscripts PA, PAIE, PAIS 
represent different cost-sharing contracts. 
 
Consider a two-echelon service supply chain consisting of an upstream service provider (SP) 
and a downstream service integrator (SI), both of whom have certain CSR preferences. To 
cooperatively reduce carbon emission and improve their social brand image, SP is responsible for 
emission reduction and service level and SI is responsible for low-carbon advertising. As discussed 
in Introduction, we suppose that SP provides an advertising cost-sharing contract to incentivize SI 
(Balachandran & Radhakrishnan, 2005). Under this context, it is supposed that SI may have three 
cost-sharing decisions: (1) not sharing any effort cost of SP (contract PA), namely, only SP shares 
 
SI’s advertising cost; (2) sharing the emission reduction cost of SP (contract PAIE), that is, SP 
shares SI’s advertising cost and SI shares SP’s carbon emission reduction cost, respectively; (3) 
sharing the service cost of SP (contract PAIS). In contrast to contract PAIE, SI directly shares SP’s 
service cost. Notice that contract PA would be called as “one-way contract” and contract PAIE or 
PAIS would be called as “two-way contract” in the main text. Following many previous papers (Xia 
et al., 2018; Zhang, Lei, Zhang, & Song, 2017), we also assume that the information is symmetric 
for every participant. Table 1 summarizes the main notation and its definitions used in this paper. 
The dynamic of emission reduction could be governed by a differential equation, which is 
jointly affected by SP’s emission reduction and SI’s advertising efforts (Zhou & Ye, 2018). It is 
intuitive that SP’s emission reduction effort can directly enhance the accumulation of emission 
reduction. The low-carbon advertising would also improve consumers’ environmental awareness, 
which may contribute to carbon emission reduction indirectly. For example, tourists can control 
their own littering behaviors while traveling, thus reducing the amount of carbon emission. If there 
are no efforts, the emission reduction level will decay over time (Jorgensen, Taboubi, & Zaccour, 
2001). Consequently, the differential equation of emission reduction can be formulated as 
 
                          
         
                        (1) 
where      represents the emission reduction at time  , and    is the initial emission reduction 
amount. In addition,      and      refer to SP’s emission reduction effort and SI’s advertising 
effort at time  , respectively. Parameters    and    are the sensitivity coefficients towards 
emission reduction and advertising efforts. Parameter    represents the decay rate of emission 
reduction over time. 
Following prior studies (He, Prasad, & Sethi, 2009; Zhang, Gou, Liang, & Huang, 2013; 
Zhang, Hafezi, Zhao, & Shi, 2017), we assume that the chain members are price-takers
1
. Namely, 
the retail price is constant under the long-term market equilibrium. However, we assume that SP can 
                                                        
1 This assumption is more consistent with the service industry. For example, the ticket prices of most scenic spots and/or the retail 
prices of restaurant dishes almost keep constant. 
 
adjust the service level whenever necessary. For example, tour attractions and/or restaurants may 
employ holiday part-time workers in response to temporary demand change. Therefore, the demand 
for the service products can be written as                                       
     , where    denotes basic demand,   denotes long-term market equilibrium retail price and 
  represents price sensitive coefficient. Without loss of generality, we define          and 
further assume      to simplify our models since it has no significant effect on our main results 
(Chutani & Sethi, 2018). We hereafter use notation            to represent the marginal profit 
of SP or SI. As a consequence, the demand function is degenerated to the following expression. 
                                                       (2) 
where coefficients  ,   and   denote the demand sensitivity coefficient towards SP's service 
effort, SI’s advertising effort and emission reduction level, respectively. Notice that   can be also 
regarded as consumers’ low-carbon preference. 
In consistent with some previous papers (Jorgensen et al., 2001; Zhang et al., 2013), we utilize 
the quadratic functions to measure the effort costs. The efforts cost towards service, emission 





          
   
    
 
         
   
    
 
         
   
    
 
                                  (3) 
where    (         represents cost sensitivity coefficient towards SP’s service effort and 
emission reduction effort, as well as SI’s advertising effort, respectively.  
Due to the focus of this paper is on environmental protection, we assume that only the effect of 
firms’ CSR behaviors in the form of environment concern is embodied in our models. We employ 
the notation         to represent the fraction of the whole supply chain’ CSR relative to the 
profitability. Following the work of Panda and Modak (2016), we also utilize the proportion 
        to denote SI’s relative CSR preference compared to SP (hereafter relative CSR) and the 
 
rest     denotes SP’s relative CSR preference. When     
 
 
, it means SI has a lower CSR 
than SP. The opposite is right for SP.   
 
 
 means no CSR difference between the two service 
companies.  
Therefore, the utility functions of upstream SP and downstream SI satisfy the following 
differential equations when there is no cost-sharing contract between SP and SI. 
      
                                    
   
    
 
 
   
    
 





      
                                
   
    
 





where   is the common discount rate of SC members’ utilities over time. The first terms of     
and     denote sale revenues; the second terms represent CSR utilities of SP and SI; the last terms 
are SP’s and SI’s corresponding effort costs.  
4. Equilibrium solutions and analysis 
In this section, we develop three cost-sharing differential game models and attempt to derive 
the analytical solutions. Furthermore, we analyze the influences of environmental factors on 
equilibrium solutions. Since the game is played over an infinite time horizon, it is reasonable to 
seek a steady state feedback Stackelberg equilibrium. Many previous scholars have argued that this 
feedback control strategy is more meaningful than the open-loop control strategy (Cellini & 
Lambertini, 2004; Piga, 2000).  
4.1. Equilibrium solutions under contract PA (Model PA) 
In this configuration, only SP provides an advertising cost-sharing rate for SI. The game 
sequence is as follows: SP first decides her cost-sharing rate, and then announces the service level 
and emission reduction effort. Afterward, SI determines his advertising effort. According to Eqs. (4) 
and (5), the optimization problems of SP and SI are standard optimal control problems given by: 
 
   
   
   
                                          
   
    
 
 
   





       
    
 
    
(6) 
   
 
   
                                     
           
    
 





both are subject to 
 
                                   
                          
         
  
(8) 
For simplicity and clarity of writing, we hereafter omit time factor when no confusion arises. 
We henceforth employ notation    
  (   
 ) to represent the net utility of the SP (SI) after time   in 
the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation (HJB). In Model PA,    
   and    
   should meet the 
following equations: 
    
      
     
                       








    
 
 
    
       
           
(9) 
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We solve these problems by backward induction. Taking derivatives of the HJB equations with 
respect to  ,  ,   and  , we can obtain the optimal responsive service level, emission reduction 
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By inserting the above Eq. (11) into Eqs. (9) and (10), we can find that the optimal function 
relying on   is the solution of the HJB equation. According to Eqs. (9)-(11), we can set the general 
forms of these functions as linear expressions:    
          and    
         , where   , 
  ,    and    are the constants to be solved. Differentiating the general functions, it leads to 
   
       and    
      . We can further obtain the optimal net utilities of SP and SI shown as 
below.  
   
                                                                                          
 
          
                                  
        
       
 (12) 
   
                           
             
       
                                     
 
                                                   
       
 (13) 
Solving the above linear equations with respect to   ,   ,    and   , we can obtain the 
optimum feedback equilibrium solutions of Model PA shown in Lemma 1. All solving processes are 
provided in Appendix A. 









      
    
  
     
                                
         
     
               
        
     
                                 
                                
  (14) 
Substituting the optimal solutions Eq. (14) into Eq. (1) yields the following equation: 
         
                          
                
 
  
              
        
       
             (15) 
According to the dynamic function of emission reduction equation Eq. (15), we can obtain the time 
trajectory of accumulated emission reduction as follows: 
 
          
          
                                (16) 
where         and   
    refers to the steady-state emission reduction, which can be given as 
  
            
            
   . The specific expression of   
    is shown in Eq. (17). 
  
    
                  
                                                   
            
      (17) 
Then, substituting the above equilibriums and state equation into the objective functions of SP 
and SI, we can obtain their optimal utilities under contract PA shown in Eqs. (18)-(19). To facilitate 
writing, we hereafter define:               ;                            
        ;                   ;                                  ; 
                             ;     
                    
  
                   
        
 . 
   
    
                 
                      
   
        
       
 
        
      
           
   (18) 
   
    
                            
                 
 
           
              
   (19) 
According to Lemma 1, we can obtain the following Proposition 1 that demonstrates the 
effects of environmental factors (i.e.,  ,   and  ) on the equilibrium solutions. 
Proposition 1. The optimal service level, emission reduction and advertising efforts, as well as SP’s 
cost-sharing rate hold the properties as below: 
(i)           ;           ;           . 
(ii)           ;           ;           . 
(iii)           ;           ;           . 
(iv) When                ,   
         and           , otherwise            
and           ;           . 
The first part of Proposition 1 indicates that SP decides her service level without considering 
CSR, SI’s relative CSR and consumers’ low-carbon preference. It can be explained that the service 
 
is independent of the parameters  ,   and   and there is no service cost transfer between SP and 
SI in this setting. From Proposition 1(ii)-(iii), it is clear that the optimal carbon emission reduction 
and advertising efforts increase in supply chain’s CSR ( ) and consumers’ low-carbon preference 
( ). The reason is straightforward because with higher   and  , the chain members can attract 
more consumers. Contrarily, both emission reduction and advertising efforts decrease with relative 
CSR. A higher   means that SP has relatively low CSR, so SP is unlikely to participate in a 
low-carbon environmental activity. This leads to lower emission reduction effort, thereby reducing 
the efficiency of SI’s advertising. As per Proposition 1(iv), it is easy to find that higher   will 
reduce the motivation of SP to share advertising cost. This further explains why SI will cut down 
his advertising investment as   increases. SP’s double reduction effects would be more obvious 
than the utility increment of SI acquiring from CSR. Moreover,                 means SP 
can gain relatively high utility from CSR but relatively low marginal profit from sales in 
comparison to SI. Hence, when   increases, the relative advantage of SP will rise. When   
increases, it will result in higher demand so as to drive up the motivation of SI investing in 
advertising. This is the reason why SP would offer a lower participation rate with the increase of 
consumers’ low-carbon preference. The opposite is true for SP when                .  
4.2. Equilibrium solutions under contract PAIE (Model PAIE) 
Under contract PAIE, the sequence of events can be described as follows: first of all, both SP 
and SI announce their cost-sharing rates. Then, SP decides her optimal service level and emission 
reduction effort. After that SI in response to SP’s optimal reaction makes an advertising decision. 
The optimization problems of chain members can be given as follows. 
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(21) 
both are subject to Eq. (8). 
Using similar notation, the optimal net utilities of SP and SI must satisfy the following HJB 
equations: 
    
        
     
                       








    
 
 
    
                    
(22) 
    
        
    
                   




    
 
 
    
             
       
(23) 
We can obtain the service companies’ time-consistent Sub-game optimal responsive decisions 
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By substituting the above Eq. (24) into Eqs. (22)-(23), we can get the stationary feedback 
Stackelberg equilibrium solutions shown in Lemma 2.  
Lemma 2. In Model PAIE, the feedback equilibrium solutions are given by 
 










      
    
  
       
                    
         
       
                      
                  
       
                                 
                                
       
                   
                  
     (25) 
Substituting the above optimal feedback equilibrium solutions into the differential function of 
emission reduction equation Eq. (1), we can obtain           under contract PAIE as follows. 
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Similarly,   
              
              
     . For the sake of readability, we omit the 
specific expression and transfer it into Appendix A. We can further have their corresponding 
optimal utilities shown as below: 
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The following Proposition 2 characterizes the impacts of supply chain members’ equilibrium 
solutions with respect to  ,   and  . Because some properties in this model are similar to that in 
Model PA, we here just present some different results. 
Proposition 2. The optimal emission reduction efforts and SI’s cost-sharing rate have the following 
properties: 
(i)             ;             ;             . 
(ii) When                ,   
           and             , otherwise         
     and             ;             . 
According to Proposition 2(i), SP’s optimal carbon emission reduction effort increases in CSR, 
 
relative CSR and consumers’ low-carbon preference. Furthermore, we can conclude that SI’s 
emission reduction cost-sharing contract can transfer his CSR preference to his partner so that the 
SP would like to implement higher emission reduction effort as   increases, thereby enhancing the 
environmental friendliness of the entire service SC. In this way, contract PAIE indeed can promote 
the cooperation between two members. Moreover, Proposition 2(ii) demonstrates that when SI can 
get more utilities from implementing low-carbon program than the revenue of selling products, he 
will provide higher cost-sharing rate for SP with the increase of   or the decrease of  . It is also 
evident that higher relative CSR would motivate SI to offer higher cost-sharing rate. 
Proposition 3. In Model PAIE, the cost-sharing contract decisions of SP and SI are presented in 
Table 2, where    
                       
        
 and    
           
      
. 
We employ Fig. 1 to facilitate our discussions. Proposition 3 demonstrates that CSR, relative 
CSR and marginal profits of chain members strongly affect SP’s and SI’s contract designs. In 
general, when the joint effect of CSR and relative CSR is relatively low, SP would like to provide 
an advertising cost-sharing contract but SI always does not offer any contract (region 1: Fig. 1(LR1), 
(MR1), and (HR1)); when it is moderate, both SP and SI would implement cost-sharing contracts 
(region 2: Fig. 1(LR2), (MR2) and (HR2)). However, when it is relatively high, the contract 
decisions of SP and SI are opposite to that in a lower situation (region 3: Fig. 1(LR3), (MR3) and 
(HR3)). From the perspective of marginal profit, when SI has a sufficiently low marginal profit, 
region 3 is the smallest (see LR3). That means it will motivate SP to provide a positive participation 
rate while SI is getting less desire to implement a cost-sharing contract. When there is no too large 
difference between SP’s and SI’s marginal profits, region 2 is the largest (see MR2). In this scenario, 
companies with smaller margin difference are more likely to agree on a two-way contract (i.e., 
contract PAIE). In addition, when SI has sufficiently high marginal profit, region 1 is the smallest 
(see HR1). In this situation, SI has the most motivation to share emission reduction cost while SP is 
most unlikely to share advertising cost.  
 
Table 2 Supply chain members’ optimal contract decisions regions under Model PAIE. 
Marginal profit Relative CSR SP’s contract decision SI’s contract decision 
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Fig. 1. Supply chain members’ optimal contract decisions regions under Model PAIE 
 
According to Lemma 2 and Proposition 3, we can derive the following Corollary 1 by 
comparing the cost-sharing rates of SP and SI when both of them implement cost-sharing contracts.  
Corollary 1. When both SP and SI provide cost-sharing contract: if           
 
   , SP 
provides higher cost-sharing rate than that of SI (i.e.,              ); if               , 
SP provides lower cost-sharing rate than that of SI (i.e.,              ), where    
         
                   
                                 
                               
. 
Corollary 1 reveals the effect of relative CSR on the optimal cost-sharing rates of SP and SI. It 
can be concluded that when SI has a lower CSR, SP would like to provide relatively high 
cost-sharing rate for SI. Conversely, SI prefers to provide higher cost-sharing rate. This is intuitive 
because the higher CSR the members have, the more utilities they can obtain from CSR so that they 
are more likely to participate in a low-carbon cooperation. Generally, chain member who has higher 
CSR is more likely to share higher cost of its partner, which is similar to the research result of 
Panda and Modak (2016).  
4.3. Equilibrium solutions under contract PAIS (Model PAIS) 
Under contract PAIS, both SP and SI first decide their cost-sharing rates, respectively. 
Afterwards, SP announces her service level and emission reduction effort, followed by SI who sets 
optimal advertising effort. The optimization control problems of them under contract PAIS are 
given as below. 
   
   
   
                                           
           





   
    
 
 
       
    
 
    
(29) 
 
   
  
   
                                       
           





       
    
 
    
(30) 
both are subject to Eq. (8). 
Analogously, in Model PAIS, the optimal net utilities of SP and SI also satisfy the 
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equations as follows: 
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(32) 
Solving the first-order conditions, we can obtain the chain members’ optimal responsive 
decisions as follows. 









   
          
     
       
  
    
       
  
     
     
  
  
                   
         
      
                   
         
      
  
          
          
   (33) 
Inserting Eq. (33) into Eqs. (31) and (32), the stationary feedback Stackelberg equilibrium 
solutions can be obtained. The following Lemma 3 summarizes these solutions. 
Lemma 3. In Model PAIS, the feedback equilibrium solutions are expressed as follows. 
 










      
    
            
       
               
        
       
                      
                  
       
                                 
                                
       
          
          
    (34) 
The differential function of emission reduction can be deduced by substituting the above 
feedback equilibrium solutions into Eq. (1), resulting in             
            
           , 
wherein   
              
              
     . Substituting the above equilibrium solutions 
and state function into the objective functions Eqs. (29) and (30), we can obtain the optimal utilities 
of chain members shown as below: 
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From Lemma 3, it can be found that consumers’ low-carbon preference, CSR and relative CSR 
cannot influence SI’s service cost-sharing rate. However, the marginal profits of SP and SI can 
make significant impacts. Specifically, SI will increase his service cost sharing fraction as his own 
margin arises but decreases with the increase of SP’s margin. As a result, when SI adopts contract 
PAIS, he just needs to care about the marginal profits of herself and SP to set a participation rate. 
Proposition 4. In Model PAIS, the cost sharing rates decisions of SP and SI can be summarized as 
follows, where    
                       
        
. 
(i) When          , SI always does not share service cost. For SP, if        , she 
always shares advertising cost; if         and     , she would share advertising cost, 
otherwise no sharing. 
(ii) When               , SI always shares service cost. For SP, if        , she 
 
always shares advertising cost; if         and     , SP would share advertising cost, 
otherwise no sharing.   
(iii) When         , SI always shares service cost. For SP, if         and     , she 
would share advertising cost, otherwise no sharing; if        , SP would not share any 
advertising cost. 
Fig. 2 is drawn to contribute to our explanations. From Proposition 4, we can understand that 
marginal profits, CSR and relative CSR play important roles in designing contracts. From the 
marginal profits’ perspective, when SI has a sufficiently low marginal profit, he never shares SP’s 
service cost. In this case, SP would provide a cost-sharing contract in most of the regions expect for 
the case of higher CSR and relative CSR. When there is no big gap between SP’s and SI’s marginal 
profits, SI always shares the service cost and SP’s contract decision is similar to that in the former 
situation. When SI has a sufficiently high margin, he also always provides a cost-sharing contract. 
SP offers a positive participation rate only when the CSR of the SC system is relatively high and 
relative CSR is low enough. In this case, SP will have the lowest motivation to implement a 
cost-sharing contract. In conclusion, SI would support SP’s emission reduction effort only if a 
condition on margins is met, namely, SI’s marginal profit is at least half of SP’s.  
 
Fig. 2. Supply chain members’ optimal contract decisions regions under Model PAIS 
 
Comparing the cost-sharing rates of SP and SI under contract PAIS, we can derive the 
following Corollary 2. We refer the readers to Corollary 1 for getting more similar properties.   
 
Corollary 2. When both SP and SI provide cost-sharing contract, if           
 
   , SP 
provides higher cost-sharing rate than that of SI (i.e.,              ); if               , 
SP undertakes lower cost-sharing rate than that of SI (i.e.,              ), where    
           
     
               
            
. 
5. Comparison among different cost-sharing contracts 
This section mainly compares the feedback equilibrium solutions. The purpose is to see how 
different cost-sharing contracts affect the optimal outcomes. In the analysis that follows, we start by 
comparing the optimal service levels, emission reduction and advertising efforts among three 
models, resulting in Proposition 5. 
Proposition 5. The optimal service levels, emission reduction and advertising efforts have the 
following relationships: 
(i) When         , we have  
                 . While         , we have  
      
  so that                   . 
(ii) When     
 
 
               or 
 
 
                  ,  
           
      , otherwise          and                   . 
(iii) Under three models,                   . 
According to Proposition 5, it can be concluded that different cooperative ways do not change 
SP’s advertising cost-sharing rates. By contrast, various cooperative contracts could influence the 
optimal service level and emission reduction effort under certain conditions. To be specific, 
Proposition 5(i) highlights that when SI has a sufficiently high marginal profit, his service 
cost-sharing contract can encourage SP to provide a higher service level. In addition, when the joint 
effect of CSR and relative CSR is relatively low or high, SI sharing SP’s emission reduction cost 
can stimulate SP to offer a higher emission reduction effort than that under Model PA, otherwise SI 
 
would not provide an emission reduction cost-sharing contract, thereby leading to the same 
emission reduction effort. In short, we conclude that the two-way contracts indeed improve the 
corresponding service level and emission reduction effort as long as SI is willing to provide positive 
participation rates. 
Corollary 3. When     
 
 
               or 
 
 
                  ,  
      
           , otherwise          and                  . 
From Corollary 3, it is obvious that emission reduction levels under Model PA and Model 
PAIS are always equal. Similar to emission reduction effort, if both relative CSR of SI and CSR of 
the service SC are sufficiently low or high, SI sharing SP’s emission reduction cost is better off for 
improving environment. When both of them are moderate, there is no motivation for SI to share the 
emission reduction cost. In a special case that the marginal profit of SI is equal to the half of SP’s, 
only when the relative CSR is high enough (     ) can the contract PAIE benefit the 
environment.  
In the following part, we will explore how supply chain members decide their own 
participation rates.  
Proposition 6. The optimum cost-sharing rates of SP and SI adhere to the following relationships: 
(i)                   . 
(ii) When                ,  
            , otherwise              . 
From Proposition 6(i), SP always adopts the identical advertising cost-sharing rate. The 
intuitive reason is that we focus on investigating different cost-sharing contracts of SI. Under such 
circumstance, SP can adjust her service level or emission reduction effort as respond to SI’s contract 
decisions instead of adjusting participation rate. It is clearly seen from Proposition 6(ii) that 
marginal profit ratio and relative CSR ratio between SP and SI have great impacts on SI’s 
cost-sharing contract decisions. In particular, if marginal profit ratio is not less than relative CSR 
 
ratio, SI will bear higher cost sharing rate in contract PAIE than that in contract PAIS. Conversely, 
he will offer a lower rate when relative CSR ratio is over than their marginal profit ratio. The reason 
behind is that higher marginal profit ratio implies that SI has a relative advantage of CSR but has a 
disadvantage of marginal profit compared to SP. Therefore, SI has more incentive to offer higher 
emission reduction cost-sharing rate so as to stimulate SP to conduct emission reduction activity. 
Otherwise, directly offering higher service sharing cost rate is better for SI. 
Next, we turn our attention to compare the supply chain’s and its members’ utilities. From 
Proposition 4(i), we know that SI always does not share the service cost when         . We first 
focus on identifying the conditions under what and which contract is the best choice when the three 
contracts can coexist under the precondition         . To facilitate exposition, we define 
                      as the universal set. 
Proposition 7. Given          and        , the optimal utilities of SP satisfy the following 
relationships:   
(i) When         , if       , then    
         
         
   , if       , then    
      
   
         
   . When         , then  
        and    
         
       
     . 
(ii) When         , if       , then    
         
         
   , if       , then    
      
   
         
   . 
where     
                       
 
                                    
 ,               
 
 
                , 
              
 
 
                , and           
 
 
           . 
Proposition 7 identifies the conditions under which SP can obtain more utility. It would say 
that when SI has a relatively high marginal profit, contracts PAIS and PAIE would be probably the 
best choice for SP. And CSR, relative CSR, and SP’s service cost efficiency significantly affect SP’s 
optimal utility. To be more specific, when the joint effect of CSR and relative CSR is adequately 
low, SI can benefit SP by offering any one of the two-way contracts. In this setting, if SP has higher 
 
service efficiency, contract PAIS is better for SP; while contract PAIE is more beneficial to SP 
under a lower service efficiency. Notice that if the CSR is sufficiently high, SI will have no 
motivation to adopt a cost-sharing contract based on SP’s emission reduction cost. From 
Proposition 7(ii), SI always wants to provide two-way contracts regardless of the value of parameter 
  when he has a high enough CSR preference.  
Proposition 8. The SI’s optimal utilities across the three models hold the following ordering 
relationships, where     
              
       
 
                        
 . 
(i) When         , we have    
         
         
   . 
(ii) When       , we have    
         
         
   . 
Proposition 8 highlights that SI providing cost-sharing contract (if     ) is always better for 
herself no matter which cost-sharing contract he selects. More specifically, when SP’s service cost 
efficiency is sufficiently high (i.e.,    is lower), he would provide SP with a cost subsidy based on 
the service cost-sharing contract. However, if SP’s service cost efficiency is lower (i.e., higher   ), 
contract PAIE is better off for SI. To sum up, SI makes a contract decision depending largely on 
SP’s service cost sensitivity coefficient.  
According to Propositions 7 and 8, we can derive the following results that reveal the 
equilibrium contract decisions of SP and SI. 
Corollary 4. Given          and        , SP and SI can achieve an equilibrium contract 
under the following conditions:   
(i) When         , if       , contract PAIS is the equilibrium contract; if       , 
contract PAIE is the equilibrium contract. 
(ii) When          and       , contract PAIS is the equilibrium contract. 
(iii) When          and                , if       , contract PAIS is the equilibrium 
contract; if       , contract PAIE is the equilibrium contract.  
 
(iv) When          and                , if       , contract PAIS is the equilibrium 
contract; if       , contract PAIE is the equilibrium contract. 
Corollary 4 points out the same contract preferences of SP and SI under precondition 
        . In other words, both SP and SI can benefit more from the equilibrium contract, which 
can ensure the long-term stability of their cooperation. In general, when SP has a relatively high 
cost efficiency of service (i.e.,    is lower), contract PAIS would be the equilibrium contract. 
However, contract PAIE would be the equilibrium contract when SP has a lower service cost 
efficiency (i.e.,    is higher). Note that when parameter   is lower but   is higher, SI would 
have no motivation to provide contract PAIE so that only contract PAIS would be the potential 
equilibrium contract. 
Proposition 9. Given          and        , the relationships of optimal utilities of the 
whole supply chain hold as follows: 
(i) When         , if       , then    
         
         
   ; if       , we have 
   
         
         
   . When         , then    
         
       
     . 
(ii) When         , if       ,    
         
         
   ; if       , we have    
      
   
         
   . 
where     
        
      
        
 
                                
               
    
 . 
According to Proposition 9, we identify the conditions under which the entire SC can obtain 
the highest utility. As per Proposition 9(i), when SI can earn higher marginal profit and both the 
CSR and relative CSR are relatively low, the service SC can get more utilities when SI provides 
either of the two-way cost-sharing contracts. In this case, higher SP’s service cost efficiency often 
brings more utility under contract PAIS than contract PAIE. In a smaller situation         , SI is 
unwilling to provide contract PAIE so that only contract PAIS may be beneficial to the whole SC. 
Similar to Proposition 7(ii), when SI has relatively high enough CSR (i.e.,      ), selecting 
 
two-ways contracts always benefit the service SC no matter what the parameter   is.  
Now, we take the case          into consideration. In this situation, we just need to 
compare contracts PA and PAIE. 
Proposition 10. Given          and        , the relationships of optimal utilities of SP, SI 
and the whole supply chain hold as follow: when         , then   
        
   ; when 
        , then  
        so that   
        
   ; when         , we have   
        
   , 
where           . 
Proposition 10 demonstrates that when SI has a sufficiently low margin, he has no motivation 
to adopt contract PAIS. In this setting, SI using contract PAIE would always benefit the whole 
service SC and its members. Put differently, given that         , contract PAIE is a dominant 
contract at the most of situations except for a special case where the parameter   is lower while   
is relatively high so that SI has no incentive to adopt contract PAIE. In the small situation, only 
contract PA may be the feasible contract for the SC. Consequently, it can be suggested that chain 
members should adopt contract PAIE to achieve Pareto improvement when SI has a relatively low 
marginal profit as long as he is willing to provide this contract. Otherwise, contract PA is the only 
potential choice. 
6. Numerical and sensitivity analysis 
In this section, we perform numerical simulations and sensitivity analyses to better understand 
the effects of some other critical system parameters on the theoretical results. The following 
parameter values are selected based on several earlier studies (Liu, Anderson, & Cruz, 2012; Zhang 
et al., 2017; Zu et al., 2018), and we further normalize them as benchmarks:           
         ,            ,                    ,              ,       , 
      ,         and      . We aim at analyzing the effects of a specific factor under given 
other parameters based on the benchmark setting. 
 
6.1. Effect analysis of factors   ,   ,    
In this subsection, we aim to scrutinize the influences of parameters   ,    and    on the 
utilities of supply chain members and the performance of the entire service SC.  
 
Fig. 3. The effects of factors   ,    and    on SP’s and SI’s utilities 
 
 
Fig. 4. The effects of factors   ,    and    on supply chain performance 
 
As shown in Figs. 3 and 4, it can be clearly found that the factors related to sate function of 
emission reduction strongly affect players’ utilities and the entire service supply chain’s utility. In 
particular, the sensitivity coefficients    and    play positive roles in promoting the utilities of 
chain members and the whole service SC, while the parameter    plays a negative role. In other 
words, when SI’s advertising and SP’s emission reduction efforts are more beneficial to improve the 
emission reduction, service firms are more likely to take part in carbon emission reduction activities. 
By contrast, a higher decay rate of emission reduction will restrain the implementation of carbon 
emission reduction. Therefore, the government should strengthen publicity propaganda of 





































































































6.2. Effect analysis of factors  ,  ,   
Similarly, using the basic parameters setting, we next focus on investigating the impacts of  , 
  and   on emission reduction and utilities of the service SC members. We here just present some 
representative illustrations and omit some very similar results to save space. 
 
Fig. 5. The effects of factors  ,   and   on emission reduction amount 
 
 
Fig. 6. The effects of factors  ,   and   on utilities of supply chain members 
 
It is known from Figs. 5 and 6 that higher service sensitivity coefficient has almost no impact 
on emission reduction, but it indeed can improve the chain members’ utilities. In other words, when 
consumers become increasingly sensitive to the service, it can just contribute to enhancing the firms’ 
utilities but cannot promote the low-carbon activity. Additionally, it can be seen that the carbon 
emission reduction and advertising coefficients have significant effects on the emission reduction 
and SC participants’ utilities. In particular, the emission reduction is sharply increasing as 
parameters   and   increase. This means when the consumers are more sensitive to the 












































































































low-carbon service industry. Similarly, when factors   and   increase, the chain members can 
obtain more utility, thereby resulting in higher SC utility.  
6.3. Effect analysis of cost coefficients   ,   ,    
In this subsection, we investigate the effects of cost sensitivity parameters   ,   ,    based 
on the previous parameters values. The illustration results are presented in the following figures. 
 
Fig. 7. The effects of coefficients   ,    and    on emission reduction amount. 
 
 
Fig. 8. The effects of coefficients   ,    and    on utilities of supply chain members. 
 
According to Figs. 7 and 8, it can be obviously observed that SP’s service cost efficiency and 
consumers’ low-carbon preference, as well as SI’s advertising cost efficiency can largely influence 
the carbon emission reduction amount and the chain members’ utilities. The effect of each type of 
cost efficiency parameters is very similar. On the whole, when the cost efficiency is getting worse 
(i.e., higher    or   ), both the emission reduction and utility of each chain member are getting 
























































































































reduction. However, it does work on the utilities of the whole service SC and its members. These 
results are relatively intuitive because less cost investment is needed to get the same emission 
reduction under higher service efficiency and there is no service-related factor into the state 
function of emission reduction. 
7. Conclusions and managerial implications 
In the context of low-carbon economic development, we consider a service supply chain 
comprised of a service provider who is responsible to conduct carbon emission reduction and a 
service integrator who is in charge of promoting the low-carbon activities in the presence of CSR. 
We focus on discussing SI’s three possible cost sharing decisions, namely, not sharing any cost of 
SP, sharing SP’s emission abatement cost and sharing SP’s service cost. According to 
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations, we derive the optimal outcomes based on utility maximization 
principle. Furthermore, we compare the feedback equilibrium outcomes across the three different 
contracts. This research makes the following major contributions. 
Firstly, this study incorporates consumers’ low-carbon preference into the low-carbon service 
SC from a differential game’s perspective. Our paper verifies that optimal emission reduction and 
low-carbon advertising efforts are always positively proportional to the consumers’ low-carbon 
preference. Hence, service enterprises should strengthen the propagation of information regarding 
low-carbon/eco-friendly activities in order to improve consumers’ environmental protection 
consciousness. Differently from the previous studies, our paper further shows that the optimal 
cost-sharing rates of supply chain members and consumers’ low-carbon preference have not a 
simple monotone correlation relationship but a relative complex relationship. This suggests that 
service firms should design appropriate cost-sharing rates for their partners on the basis of different 
consumers’ low-carbon preference. 
Secondly, taking account of the service firms’ CSR behaviors generates an alternative avenue 
for profit maximization in service supply chains management. Deviating from the 
 
profit-maximizing principle, our paper confirms that enterprises' CSR behaviors have significant 
influences on optimal service level, emission reduction and advertising efforts. The outcome of this 
research shows that higher CSR invariably motivates chain members to provide higher emission 
reduction and advertising efforts under three contracts. This means that the whole supply chain’s 
CSR indeed contributes to the development of low-carbon economy. Additionally, SI adopting 
contract PAIE can change the effect trend of SI’s relative CSR compared to contracts PA and PAIS 
where higher relative CSR would lead to lower emission reduction and advertising efforts. While in 
contract PAIE, they are increasing in relative CSR. This implies that contract PAIE can eliminate 
the environmental preference conflict between upstream and downstream firms in a service SC 
system, which is conducive to supply chain members for agreeing on an identical contract. 
Lastly, the study results provide some guidelines on setting service, emission reduction and 
advertising for service firms and contribute a theoretical basis for the cost-sharing contract design 
for a low-carbon service SC when chain members have CSR behaviors. It concludes that two-way 
cost-sharing contracts could be beneficial to the whole SC and its members but it does not mean 
that the decision-maker is always willing to adopt a two-way contract. Sometimes contract PA may 
be the unique feasible contract. When SI is willing to take the two-way contracts, we find that the 
service cost sensitivity coefficient is the main factor that would affect the contract decision. 
Furthermore, when SP’s service efficiency is lower, SI prefers to adopt contract PAIE. Otherwise, 
contract PAIS is better for him. More importantly, contracts PAIS and PAIE would be the potential 
equilibrium contract when SI’s marginal profit is relatively high. However, when it is lower 
contracts PAIE and PA would be the possible equilibrium contract. Therefore, it can be suggested 
that service SC members should choose an appropriate contract to maximize their expected utilities 
depending on their marginal profits, CSR, relative CSR and service cost efficiency as well as 
consumers’ low-carbon preference. 
Despite our research’s several major contributions to the literature on low-carbon economic 
and cost-sharing contract design, there are still some limitations and deficiencies for future research 
 
to address. Firstly, our paper focuses on discussing three different cost-sharing contracts. Hence, 
future research can be done on other frequently used coordinative contracts (e.g., revenue/profit 
sharing contract, quantity discount contract and quantity flexibility contract). Secondly, our results 
are established by assuming completely symmetric information. In practice, cost and/or demand 
information may be private information. Therefore, considering the possibility of asymmetric 
information could be another possible future research direction. Finally, our paper assumes 
deterministic demand. So, further research can consider stochastic market demand in modeling and 
analysis. 
 
Appendix A. Proofs of Lemmas 
Proof of Lemma 1  
According to Eq. (10), it can be deduced that 
     
  
   
           , which means the 
utility function of SI is concave in  . In addition, the Hessian matrix of the SP’s utility function is 
        
    
    
    
 . Therefore, we can have          
      and the first-order sequence 
principal minor is negative. Hence, we can obtain Eq. (11) by solving the following first-order 
conditions.  
          ;                    
     ;          
      
         
                                     
            
       
         
    
 
Solving the linear Eqs. (12) and (13), we can obtain the values of   ,   ,    and    as follows: 
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By substituting above equations into Eq. (11), we can get Lemma 1. 
Proof of Lemma 2 
Similar to Lemma 1, we omit the solving processes and just list the key values of parameters 
  ,   ,    and    as follows: 
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The concrete expression of stationary emission reduction level is  
  
      
                     
                                        
            
    
Proof of Lemma 3 
Similarly, the parameters   ,   ,    and    are given as follows. 
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The concrete expression of stationary emission reduction level is 
  
      
                
                                        
            
   
 
Appendix B. Proofs of Propositions and Corollaries 
Proof of Proposition 1  
It is easy to find that      is independent of parameters  ,   and  , so we can get 
 
Proposition 1(i). In addition, taking first-order partial derivatives of     ,      and      with 
respect to  ,   and   yields the following expressions.  
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Hence, we can obtain Proposition 1 by discussing the sign of each expression in above equations. 
Proof of Proposition 2  
By observing the optimal carbon emission reduction, it is obvious that             , 
             and             . Similar to Proposition 1, we have 
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Hence, we can obtain Proposition 2 by discussing the sign of each expression in above equations. 
Proof of Proposition 3 
Lemma 2 gives    
                                 
                                
;    
                   
                  
. By 
discussing the signs of    and   , we can easily obtain the Proposition 3. 
Proof of Corollary 1 
According to Lemma 2, making difference between        and        yields the following 
equation. 
              
 
                 
     
                
                                             
 
                                                   
         
 
Therefore, when           
 
   , we have              , and vice versa. 
Proof of Proposition 4 is similar to Proposition 3. 
Proof of Corollary 2 is similar to Corollary 1. 
Proof of Proposition 5 
It can be easily found that            ,             and                   . 
Comparisons of the services and emission reductions under contracts PAIE and PAIS lead to the 
following expressions. 
              
           
   
,               
                       
          
        
Consequently, discussing the signs of the above expressions yields Proposition 5. 
Proof of Corollary 3 
By taking the difference among emission reduction levels across the three cost-sharing 
contracts, we can have the following expressions:              ,               
                       
 
          
. Hence, it is easy to derive the corollary by discussing the signs of these 
expressions. 
Proof of Proposition 6 
Similar to Proposition 5, we have               
                 
                           
. When 
             , we can obtain  
            , and vice versa. 
Proof of Proposition 7 
Comparing the SP’s optimal utilities in the three cost-sharing contracts, we can have the 
following expressions.   
   
         
    
                                    
 
          
  
   
         
      
                        
                                        
  
            
  
   
         
    
               




By discussing the signs of the above expressions, the proposition can be completely verified. 
Proof of Proposition 8 
Similar to Proposition 7, we here provide the corresponding difference value expressions as 
follows.  
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Proof of Corollary 4 
Making a difference between the thresholds     and     yields the following result. 
        
                                     
 
                                    
                    
Based on above equation and Propositions 7 and 8, we can derive the Corollary 4 by finding out the 
same parameter regions under which SP and SI have the same preference for the optimal contract. 
Proof of Proposition 9 
Similarly, we here provide the corresponding comparative results as follows:   
   
         
    
                                           
 
          
  
   
         
      
 
    
                                 
     
      
     
 
         
      
        
 
 
            
  
   
         
    
       
     
  
   
  
 
Proof of Proposition 10 is similar to Propositions 7-9. 
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